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Abstract 
As a way to make medical decisions, Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) has failed. EBM's failure arises from not being 
founded on real-world decision-making. EBM aspires to a scientific standard for the best way to treat a disease and 
determine its cause, but it fails to recognise that the scientific method is inapplicable to medical and other real-world 
decision-making. EBM also wrongly assumes that evidence can be marshaled and applied according to an hierarchy that is 
determined in an argument by authority to the method by which it has been obtained. If EBM had valid theoretical, practical 
or empirical foundations, there would be no hierarchy of evidence. In all real-world decision-making, evidence stands or 
falls on its inherent reliability. This has to be and can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis applying understanding and 
wisdom against the background of all available facts—the “factual matrix.” EBM's failure is structural and was inevitable 
from its inception. EBM confuses the inherent reliability and probative value of evidence with the means by which it is 
obtained. 
EBM is therefore an ad hoc construct and is not a valid basis for medical decision-making. This is further demonstrated 
by its exclusion of relevant scientific and probative real-world decision-making evidence and processes. It draws upon a 
narrow evidence base that is itself inherently unreliable. It fails to take adequate account of the nature of causation, the full 
range of evidence relevant to its determination, and differing approaches to determining cause and effect in real-world 
decision-making. EBM also makes a muddled attempt to emulate the scientific method and it does not acknowledge the role 
of experience, understanding and wisdom in making medical decisions. 
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Evidence-Based Medicine aspires to a scientific standard 
for the best way to treat a disease and determine its cause. 
An outgrowth of clinical epidemiology, it utilizes 
statistical trials to guide individual patient care [1]. 
Advocates of statistics-based research coined the term 
“Evidence-Based Medicine” in 1992. We examine here the 
shortcomings of EBM and the limited role it plays in 
answering this ‘real world’ question:  
 
“In deciding which treatment modality I, the 
physician, should adopt for the patient before me 




EBM is proposed to remedy what are considered failings in 
medicine, such as the wide variations in clinical practice, 
the use of unproven treatments and failures to utilise 
practice guidelines. EBM strives to use the “best available 
evidence” in making medical decisions and especially 
evidence that is obtained through epidemiological and 
biostatistical ways of thinking. It considers randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs) and systematic reviews of multiple 
RCTs to be the most reliable evidence. Its advocates argue 
that this is the kind of evidence physicians need to use to 
make decisions, in a scientific way, about the care of 
individual patients. Proponents accord such evidence an 
“A”, because they say it is scientifically obtained and of a 
kind least susceptible to research and other biases. 
Miller and Miller 
 




296 The International Journal of Person Centered Medicine 
Volume 1 Issue 2 pp 295-300 
 
 
The Oxford Centre for Evidence-based Medicine 
defines ten Levels of Evidence, which it grades “A” (the 
least biased) through “D” (the most biased). It gives an 
“A” to RCTs and systematic reviews of those trials (meta-
analyses). The Levels of Evidence table downplays cohort 
and case-control studies, giving them a “B.” Clinical case 
series and “poor quality cohort and case-control studies” 
are consigned a “C.” [2]. It gives a “D” to “Expert opinion 
without explicit critical appraisal, or based on physiology, 
bench research or ‘first principles’ ”. In so doing, EBM 
diminishes important evidence that physicians use to make 
medical decisions. Notable are (unquantifiable) clinical 
experience and an (also unquantifiable) understanding of 
pathophysiologic mechanisms of disease. EBM calls 
evidence based on 30-40 years of clinical experience that a 
physician uses to make a medical decision “anecdotal” and 
not sufficiently reliable for inclusion. 
In a comprehensive, well researched and detailed 
critique of EBM's reliance on RCTs and observational 
statistical studies reviewed within this issue of the Journal, 
James Penston, in Stats.con: How we’ve been fooled by 
statistics-based research in medicine, documents how 
statistics-based research is  fundamentally flawed, resistant 
to independent testing and lacks sound foundations. 
Penston's main objection to statistics-based medicine is 
that modern large-scale statistical studies claiming 
treatment effects in small sub-groups are inherently 
unreliable, for a wide variety of fundamental reasons.  
Criticisms of the internal validity of RCTs and their basis 
for causal inference remain unresolved. External validity, 
the reliability of generalization to the wider population, is 
always open to question and deliberate concealment of the 
size of treatment effects by some researchers can occur [3].  
Noting that statistical data apply to groups, not to 
individuals, Penston cites R.A. Fisher, who early in the 20th 
century wrote, “Statistics is the study of populations, or 
aggregates of individuals, rather than of individuals.” For 
‘Mrs Smith’, with her specific set of problems, EBM will 
not directly enable the doctor to make the correct medical 
decision for her treatment needs. Strikingly, it has been 
estimated that 127 RCTs would have to be done in 63,500 
patients over a 286-year period to determine the optimal 
combination of agents to treat Alzheimer’s disease [4].  
Cohen and colleagues [1] address five widely cited 
criticisms of EBM. They are: 1) its reliance on empiricism, 
2) its narrow definition of evidence, 3) the lack of evidence 
for EBM’s efficacy, 4) its limited usefulness for individual 
patients, and 5) the threats EBM poses to the autonomy of 
the doctor/patient relationship. EBM tries to apply 
principles of epidemiology to individual patient care, 
basing that care on statistical trials. This narrow definition 
of evidence excludes other information important to 
clinicians. And EBM fails to provide a means to integrate 
non-statistical forms of medical information, like clinical 
experience and patient-specific factors. Furthermore, the 
authors of this critique note that there is no evidence that 
EBM is indeed effective in providing higher quality health 
care. 
Ackoff posits a now well-known model in information 
science, proceeding from data to information to knowledge 
to understanding and finally wisdom [5].  Data consists of 
raw facts and figures. It has no significance beyond its 
existence, in and of itself, absent of any relation to other 
things. Information is data that acquires meaning, useful or 
not, from its connection to other things.  Knowledge is 
what you know. Understanding is the process by which 
new knowledge can be derived from existing knowledge. 
Wisdom is the ability to perceive outcomes and determine 
their value and to increase effectiveness of existing 
knowledge and understanding. 
EBM provides information on statistical relationships. 
Its data and information offers knowledge, but EBM does 
not deliver understanding of the particular disease or its 
pathophysiology, nor does it provide wisdom. As Penston 
shows, the knowledge that EBM offers is often wrong and 
even if right, frequently inconsequential in everyday 
clinical practice. Real-world decision-making evaluates 
and utilises the available factual matrix, which includes 
clinical experience, case reports and case series and 





People marshal evidence to support current beliefs and to 
establish causation. EBM endorses the hypothesis that 
evidence of a statistically significant outcome in a  
randomised controlled trial justifies causal inference. The 
transition from statistical significance to causation in 
clinical epidemiology began in the late 1950s and was 
codified with the publication of the U.S. Surgeon 
General’s report on smoking and health in 1964 [6]. Cause, 
as the report defines it, expresses “the notion of a 
significant, effectual, relationship between an agent and an 
associated disorder or disease in the host.” Recognizing 
that “the causal significance of an association is a matter of 
judgment which goes beyond any statement of statistical 
probability,” the writers of the report list five 
epidemiological criteria with which to judge causation. In 
examining the association of smoking with lung cancer, 
they judged that smoking causes lung cancer because of 
the association’s Consistency – the two occur together in 
different populations and locations, and at different times, 
favouring a causal relationship; its Strength – there is an 
exceptionally high relative risk linking smoking to lung 
cancer; Specificity – the accuracy with which the 
occurrence of the cause (smoking) predicts the occurrence 
of the effect (lung cancer); Temporal relationship – the 
cause precedes the effect; and Coherence, which refers to 
the degree a causal relationship (smoking and lung cancer) 
may be accommodated with pre-existing knowledge and 
theory. 
Bradford Hill [7] and others [8,9] have put forth 
additional epidemiological criteria of disease causation, 
which include a Biological gradient – a dose-response 
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curve, where, with smoking, the death rate from lung 
cancer rises linearly with the number of cigarettes smoked; 
Plausibility – the causation is biologically plausible; 
Experiments that confirm the epidemiological findings; 
and Analogy, in cases where it would be reasonable to 
judge the association by analogy. 
With EBM today, the statistical strength of an 
association alone has become the sole arbiter of a causal 
relationship.  Researchers pay little heed to other non-
quantifiable epidemiological criteria for judging causation 
and have lost sight of the fact that it is the strength of 
association taken in conjunction with all the other criteria 
that justifies a causal inference. 
In promoting statistics-based research, EBM has 
divorced itself from real-world common sense and the 
scientific assessment of causation. Statistical research, as 
Penston puts it, “has slipped its mooring and floats free, 
unfettered by the constraints normally imposed on causal 
judgments.” In modern statistics-based medicine, Penston 
notes that causal inference is based on small differences in 
the frequency of occurrence and non-concurrence of an 
effect with and without an intervention. RCTs and 
observational statistical studies are also applied to 
heterogeneous, not homogeneous, groups, where there will 
be considerable variation between participants which is not 
always subject to proper control during a trial.  Assessment 
of causation cannot therefore be scientific. RCTs wrongly 
ascribe a causal inference for a specific drug when no 
treatment effect is demonstrable with that drug for the 
majority of participants, only perhaps for a small sub-
group in the heterogeneous group of trial participants [3].   
A particular strain of bacteria can cause a specific 
disease; but a single factor is rarely the cause of chronic 
diseases like obesity, diabetes, heart disease, and cancer. 
Several factors, temporally related, cause these diseases.  
Researchers implicated the bacteria Helicobacter pylori as 
“causing” gastritis and peptic ulcer disease.  As much as 70 
to 85 percent of some populations have these bacteria in 
their stomachs and they remain asymptomatic [10]. 
Epidemiology played no part in the establishing the causal 
association which was previously long denied. 
Additionally such studies cannot establish the absence of a 
causal association.  In papers that claim their negative 
results "do not support" a causal association between factor 
X and effect Y, one must conclude that the authors do not 
understand the fundamental issues involved in the 
establishment of cause and effect within biological 
systems. 
Penston tacitly avoids attempting to demark a 
boundary for the reliability of statististical studies between 
those where relative risks/benefits and odds ratios are low 
and where they are higher, (say 30 or more such as for an 
association between heavy smoking and lung cancer).  
Aside from the simplistic approach of statistics-based 
medicine to assessment of causation, one justification is 
that, as Penston demonstrates, internal validity of RCTs is 
rarely met by randomization, allocation concealment, 
double-blinding, accounting for withdrawals and drop-
outs.  This thus renders questionable the reliability of 
claimed results and tests of statistical confidence and 
significance [3]. An overarching reason for not doing so 
reflects a principal failing of the foundation of Evidence-
Based Medicine.   
EBM wrongly posits that evidence can be ascribed a 
level of inherent reliability according to an hierarchy 
established by appeal to the assumed authority of the 
method by which the evidence is obtained. In real world 
decision-making, items of evidence stand or fall on their 
own inherent reliability.  Establishing reliability of 
evidence requires examination and assessment of it on a 
case-by-case basis against the background of the available 
factual matrix for the decision under consideration [11]. 
EBM also advises medical practitioners to turn to pertinent 
journal papers when considering treatment options. But in 
a significant contradiction of their position, EBM 
proponents acknowledge that the overall quality of the 
modern journal published evidence base is poor. Leading 
journal editors also hold the same view [12,13]. It has been 
suggested that “we should abandon pre publication review 
and paying excessive attention to 'top journals’” [14].  
EBM compounds its ‘real world’ failing in judging 
causation by excluding and relegating to a lower level 
other probative forms of evidence. Its advocates talk down 
evidence from case series and case reports, contending that 
such evidence is observational and not collected in a 
“scientific” manner. They label it “anecdotal.” Anecdotal 
evidence covers all human observations, scientific and 
otherwise. It is the personal observation of the observer. 
Witness testimony in court is “anecdotal.” But when 
subjected to scrutiny - and in the courtroom to cross-
examination, anecdotal evidence can be as reliable or 
unreliable as any other form of evidence.  Anecdotal 
eyewitness testimony can be tested and weighed according 
to its inherent reliability and cross-correlated and 
corroborated by other evidence in the available “factual 
matrix”. 
In order to prove that A causes B, as is done in 
determining guilt in a Court of Law, the medical 
practitioner must address the available factual matrix 
bearing on the case. In medicine, this matrix might 
encompass, in addition to the patient's account and clinical 
history, RCTs and systematic reviews, cohort and case-
control studies, case series and case reports, clinical 
experience, expert opinion, in vitro (test tube) research, 
animal “bench” research and deductive reasoning based on 
pathophysiologic mechanisms of disease. Causation, 
established by evidence collected from an often wide-
ranging factual matrix is tied to individual events in the 





Humans apply different standards of “proof” depending 
upon the degree of certainty a decision requires [11].  The 
Miller and Miller 
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highest standard, requiring the best evidence, is the 
scientific standard of proof. It must be Irrefutable. 
Successively lower criminal and civil standards of proof 
are Beyond a reasonable doubt – the criminal standard for 
life and liberty cases; Clear and convincing (in U.S. 
courts) – a civil judgment that implies, “If that’s what it is, 
I’d better believe it,” for settling disputes involving child 
custody, involuntary commitment, withdrawal of life 
support in comatose patients, and determination of a 
“punishable frame of mind” driven by malice, oppression, 
or fraud; and More likely than not – for a civil judgment 
requiring that the balance of probability be greater than 50 
percent to support, or undermine, a disputed proposition. 
In order to obtain a licence for public use, the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) subjected the 
pharmaceutical Vioxx (rofecoxib), as it does to all new 
prescription drugs, to rigorous RCTs to prove that the drug 
is both safe and effective [15]. The subsequent debacle of 
Vioxx, with its belatedly-found increased risk of 
cardiovascular complications, is just one example among 
many demonstrating that EBM’s RCT-derived evidence is 
not reliable. RCT evidence sometimes does not even meet 
the civil More likely than not standard of proof, 
particularly where multiple RCTs on a given subject 
provide conflicting evidence. Physicians cannot rest 
assured that RCT evidence demonstrating that a newly 
licensed drug is safe and effective is in fact true. 
There is another aspect of the scientific standard of 
proof that particularly impacts medicine. Science’s quest 
for objective certainty admits only a narrow range of 
evidence. The “pure” sciences such as physics and 
chemistry have made the word “science” mean ‘creating 
reliable knowledge and understanding to a high degree of 
confidence’. Other disciplines have attempted  to emulate 
that success and have borrowed the same word to describe 
what they do. But the “soft” sciences, such as economics 
and sociology, and the practice of medicine, are inherently 
incapable of achieving the same scientific success. 
A more fundamental issue is that the scientific method 
is inapplicable for addressing broadly based questions of 
immediate relevance in day-to-day medical decision-
making.  “Science” and “scientific” are terms used 
commonly but inappropriately in medicine to imply, by 
association, an unjustified imprimatur of “scientific” 
validity or authority and particularly by reference to papers 
published in peer-reviewed journals. The success of the 
scientific method in the pure sciences is contingent on 
formulating narrow, closely defined questions, or 
hypotheses, which are tested by experiments designed to 
eliminate and/or control all variables other than that being 
tested.  The hypotheses posed are those that are capable of 
yielding precise, often numerical, answers. In medicine 
especially, precise and narrow questions cannot usually be 
formulated against which single variables can be tested, so 
the ability to obtain knowledge to a high degree of 
precision is substantially diminished.   
One form of medical evidence that does approach the 
scientific standard of proof is a special kind of case report, 
a source of evidence that EBM demeans. In pharmacology, 
the most powerful proof of causation is a single well-
documented challenge-dechallenge-rechallenge case report 
that shows event A caused adverse event B. Unlike 
evidence from RCTs and systematic reviews, the evidence 
from a single well documented spontaneous report of a 
Challenge-Dechallenge-Rechallenge (CDR) case is often 
the strongest form of proof of causation if not irrefutable 
[11] . A drug is administered (the challenge) and adverse 
symptoms arise. Then the drug is withdrawn and the 
symptoms abate (dechallenge). If the offending drug is re-
administered (rechallenge) after the adverse symptoms 
have subsided and the same symptoms recur, this is 
normally proof that the drug caused the adverse symptoms 
[2]. Lacking a rechallenge to test the hypothesis, one 
cannot be sure that withdrawing the drug is related to the 
drop in symptoms in a single patient; but the drug is highly 
likely to be the cause of the symptoms if, on withdrawing 
it, symptoms abate in three patients.  Three well 
documented case series reports of challenge-dechallenge 
evidence is of equal power to CDR in proving causation. 
Scientific evidence, then, plays a very small role, other 
than with CDR case reports, in the practice of medicine. 
CDR case reports are particular examples of the general 
evidential value of case series and the power of cross-
correlation and corroboration. The probative value of an 
isolated spontaneous report may seem weak.  Multiple 
independent such reports of the same effect cross-correlate 
and corroborate, providing potentially powerful evidence 
of cause and effect.  Under EBM, the potentially strong 
probative value of case series is significantly undervalued. 
 
 
Medical failure and political 
success 
 
EBM has failed in the real world of medicine, in terms of 
its use in making medical decisions and in proving 
causality. It has been successful politically. Health service 
managers, public health professionals, biostatisticians, 
health economists and politicians continue to prosper using 
the statistics that EBM provides, acting to rein in the 
purported dangers of passive smoking and low-dose 
radiation and to promote the claimed benefits of low fat 
diets, statins and influenza immunization. As Charlton and 
Miles have previously observed, “EBM stands revealed as 
statistical rather than scientific; its success more to do 
with managerial dominance than medical desirability.” 
[16].  
The word ‘statistics’ originates from the Latin 
statisticus, meaning “matter of state.” There is a close 
relationship between statistics and politics. Politicians have 
learned how to massage and rework statistics to their 
advantage, as they often do when reporting  unemployment 
figures and inflation rates. George Orwell notes that 
notions of truth and falsity do not apply to the realm of 
statistics. They are an instrument the State uses to control 
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our thoughts and actions – and to dictate health care. In the 
real world of 21st century medicine, physicians would do 
well to reconsider and reassign the position of statistics-
based EBM in medical decision-making to a lesser 
prominence.   Should it even be consigned to the 
wastebasket of medical mistakes, alongside the  bleeding 
of people in the 17th and 18th centuries and treating syphilis 
with mercury in the 19th and early 20th centuries? 
 
 
Real-World Evidence-Based Medical 
Decision Making (EBMDM) 
 
As Osler so well put it, “Medicine is art of probabilities, or 
at best, a science of uncertainty” [17].  Medicine is a 
pragmatic, probabilistic activity, where decisions must be 
made on the basis of available evidence and within a 
limited time frame. In the practice of medicine, attempting 
to employ only a narrowly focussed scientific standard of 
proof is inappropriate and impossible [11].  The kind of 
evidence that the current model of “Evidence-Based 
Medicine” provides is knowledge focussed on statistical 
knowledge.  EBM does not provide understanding, nor 
promotes wisdom. To attain understanding of a disease and 
its treatment and possible prevention a physician needs to 
take an Oslerian approach and embrace the available 
factual matrix pertaining to it. 
Health care providers have been led to believe that the 
best evidence for making medical decisions comes from 
randomised controlled trials. But in the real world, one 
must consider  RCTs, including those published in leading 
peer reviewed medical journals, with a healthy scepticism. 
One must also firstly determine who funded the study. The 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries fund more 
than 60 percent of the RCTs that medical journals publish, 
which raises the concern that supposedly objective science 
is being turned into a marketing tool [18]. As Penston and 
we show, RCTs are  not reliable and tainted by bias. One 
observer puts it this way, “Epidemiological analysis is 
notoriously susceptible to misinterpretation, and even 
manipulation. Two sets of researchers can extract 
diametrically opposed results from the same data.” [19]. 
In making ‘real world’ medical decisions, even if an 
RCT is scientifically conducted, accurate, and unbiased, 
relative risk reduction percentages can be misleading. 
Physicians must look for the absolute risk reduction and 
the number-needed-to-treat (NNT). An RCT on 
immunisation against influenza during pregnancy to 
prevent influenza in infants published in the New England 
Journal of Medicine found that the incidence of influenza 
in infants whose mothers were immunized during their 
pregnancy was 4% (6/159). The incidence of influenza in 
infants whose mothers were not immunized was 10% 
(16/157). In this study (done in Bangladesh and funded by 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Wyeth 
Pharmaceuticals and others), influenza immunization 
reduced the relative risk of influenza in infants by a 
seemingly impressive 63%. But only 6 out of 100 infants 
benefited from the immunization. One would have to 
subject 100 infants in utero to the immunization, the 
“number-needed-to-treat”, to benefit just 6 of them [20]. 
The other 94 received no benefit, 4 contracted influenza 
and all were placed at risk from being harmed by the 
vaccine, particularly from the adjuvants in it, which 
include mercury, aluminium, and formaldehyde. 
Strikingly, in a recent Cochrane Collaboration systematic 
review of influenza vaccines, it was concluded that 
influenza vaccines in adults have only a modest effect. 
There was “no evidence that they affect complications, 
such as pneumonia, or transmission.” Reliable evidence 
was “thin” and there was evidence of widespread 
manipulation of conclusions and spurious interpretation of 
the studies reviewed.  These included 15 out of 36 trials 
funded by Industry and 4 that had no source of funding 
declaration [21].  
In the five major studies of statin drugs, the 
Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival Study (4S), the 
Cholesterol and Recurrent Events Trial (CARE), the Long-
term Intervention with Pravastatin in Ischemic Disease 
(LIPID), the West of Scotland Coronary Prevention Study 
(WOSCOPS), and the Air Force Coronary Atherosclerosis 
Prevention Study (AFCAPS), the end points of total 
mortality and non-fatal myocardial infarction had a relative 
risk reduction of 19% and 29% respectively. But the 
absolute risk reduction of total mortality was a trivial 1.6% 
and that of non-fatal myocardial infarct, a not-much-better 
3% [22]. Less than 5% of patients placed on long-term 
treatment with statins to lower cholesterol and prevent 
coronary artery disease, will derive any benefit whatsoever 
from them. The same principle applies to other drug trials. 
When ‘Mrs. Smith’ comes to the office complaining of leg 
cramps and lapses in memory, the best real-world decision 
for her is to stop her statins and prescribe Coenzyme Q 10. 
Researchers know that the best way to get their study 
published is to avoid dissent from orthodoxy. Peer 
reviewers, whose expertise and status can too often be tied 
to the prevailing view on a given subject, are unlikely to 
welcome challenge to it. It is a system inherently biased to 
supporting prevailing views. As one observer puts it, “peer 
review outlaws paradigm change.” State-sanctioned 
paradigms in the biomedical sciences that have become 
unquestionable dogma include: a) cholesterol and saturated 
fats cause coronary artery disease; b) mutations in genes 
cause cancer; c) a virus called HIV (human 
immunodeficiency virus) causes AIDS (acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome); d) the damaging effects of toxins 
are dose-dependent in a linear fashion down to zero, where 
even a tiny amount of a toxin, such as radiation or cigarette 
smoke, will harm some people (the linear no-threshold 
hypothesis); and e) vaccines are safe and effective. In the 
real-world of medical decision making, each one of these 
dogmas deserves scrutiny [23]. Relying only on PubMed-
listed journals to examine them and to frame medical 
decisions will not suffice. The U.S. government’s PubMed, 
for example, excludes Fluoride, the Quarterly Journal of 
Miller and Miller 
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the International Society for Fluoride Research.  It 
publishes papers that question government-approved and 
sponsored fluoridation of public water supplies. PubMed 
also excludes the Journal of American Physicians and 
Surgeons.  This journal publishes papers that question the 
accepted wisdom on cholesterol, HIV/AIDS, low-dose 





Real-world EBMDM needs to embrace an inclusive factual 
matrix.  It should consider alternative viewpoints and 
question majority consensus, accepted biomedical 
paradigms. Indeed, it should include various types of 
observational studies, the clinical experience of a 70-year 
old physician, bench research, (critically considered) 
expert opinion, and deductive reasoning grounded on 
pathophysiologic mechanisms of disease and the patient's 
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